FAQs

The question: »Was Kant, Hegel …. a racist, anti-Semitic, sexist …?« still continues to dominate academic and public debate. However, the question as such is not unproblematic: It limits the discussion of the subject from the start to a certain person with the intention of concluding with an overly simple yes-or-no answer. The problem is far more complex than that and cannot be understood as an either-or decision. It is the intention of our project to show that we need to ask other questions – therefore, we start off by asking: »How should we deal with rsa in classical works of philosophy?«

In many of our so-called classical works we find passages expressing rsa. However, they cannot simply be isolated as unique passages or ascribed to certain persons. Moreover, rsa are not only „historical“ phenomena. 
Instead, we assume that rsa ideologies as such evolved into traditions over time and that these were expressed not only but precisely also in philosophical works that we apprehend today. For, rsa stereotypes and narratives still do shape our ideas, judgements and actions today. Up until today, philosophers like Kant are enlisted to support rsa ideologies. We ask ourselves self-critically how rsa traditions in philosophical works implicitly and explicitly shape our concepts, patterns of thought and philosophical practice. Because if we do not critically reflect on this heritage and let it pass without comment, then we will carry on this heritage in the tradition of philosophy.

As a rule, rsa does not present itself explicitly, rather it becomes evident in subtle forms of derogation and exclusion or non-acknowledgement of »other« traditions (e.g. non-European) of philosophy or the exclusion of certain groups of people. The psychological phenomenon of »Fremdwertnegation« (negation of foreign values) is a widespread practice in philosophy – this is to say, the derogation of other, different, criticized positions. From time to time, this practice seizes on rsa clichés.

This can also happen to people who are firmly convinced that they pursue philosophy as a critical science and that – not least for this reason – they are free of prejudice or examine themselves self-critically. However, since one – and this also includes us – can be mistaken, we are convinced that we will only be able to get a clear view of the blind spots and unquestioned but possibly problematic convictions by means of interdisciplinary discourse and exchanging views with the public sphere. An anecdote may help clarify what is meant: While preparing to go to a conference in Brazil a couple of years ago, several colleagues asked me (A.E.) whether I thought that I would be able to learn anything there and whether I was going there to provide development aid (in Kant research). Although these kinds of statements do not necessarily need to be considered racist yet, they do reflect a remarkable arrogance in a globalized world and are an example of the widespread attitude that, at the most, a western philosopher has something to »export« but would not learn anything from colleagues having their roots in non-western countries and traditions.

We believe that it is important to recognize and explain the political dimension of the problem. Accordingly, rsa needs to be understood above all as a phenomenon of interaction between people that goes beyond the individual as well as an expression of the social balance of power, which also shapes traditions and structure and, thus, affects us today as well. The works of classical writers are one medium, in which racist, sexist and anti-Semitic ideas are preserved but also reproduced through the reception of the works. The derogatory passages contained in the works still have an effect today. Moreover, the discussion about how to deal with this has evolved into an emotionally charged and polarized public discussion. No matter if or how one responds, one always takes a stand.

Our primary objective is to determine how we can acquire and retain a permanent awareness of the problem in philosophical discourse, in research and teaching as well as in public debate. This would be an appropriate critical attitude because it would be aware of its own limited perspective and its fallibility and, moreover, because it would not let itself be quieted by a judgement made at some point in time. To the contrary: The point is to raise new self-critical questions so as to be able to continuously review and thoroughly study any entanglements in one’s own thinking and actions.

Apart from providing elucidating contributions to the public discourse, we hope to promote an institutional learning process in academic philosophy – in other words, to firmly establish a reflected and differentiated attitude towards our rsa heritage in the research and teaching of academic philosophy. To this end, we will try to find new, experimental formats for use in schools and universities

1. Fundamentals of a (self-)critical history of philosophy: Bring out clearly the subject in the relevant historical and social constellations, question the custom of stylizing classical philosophers as isolated geniuses who developed their thoughts on their own initiative, and critically assess methods of historiography, processes of canon formation and forms of reception of the history of philosophy.

2. Commentated collections of texts and material for teaching and research: The collection will be accompanied by various interpretations as well as analyses of exemplary philosophical argumentation, and it will provide overviews of the state of research. Based on this, materials and conceptions for teaching at universities and schools are to be drawn up by means of interdisciplinary collaboration and provided on the project’s homepage.

3. Experimental and creative forms of conveying awareness: In order to develop an appropriate awareness of the problem within established forms of philosophical thinking and practice and, if necessary, to subject them to criticism, new and creative forms of (self-)enlightenment and conveying awareness will be tested from the start. They are designed to stimulate critical (self-)reflection through an experience of irritation, a shift in habitual codifications etc., thereby making new perspectives comprehensible.

4. »Public Philosophy« in dialog: Within the scope of the project, a methodically reflected and differentiated concept of Public Philosophy that, in particular, is designed to promote dialog with (and not instruction of) the public sphere will be developed and tested in practice from the start. In this connection, philosophy will be considered a part of the public sphere which, on their part, can act as an instance of reflection for philosophical cognitive processes.

Our work is based on understanding »reflective (faculty of) judgement« in the sense of Kant and Hannah Arendt. Contrary to »determinative (faculty of) »reflective judgement« does not subsume already existing and established concepts. Instead, it takes relevant (also linguistic) practices as its starting point and seeks new creative connections between their essential aspects so as to arrive at a »practical universality« as compared to a mere generalization. In doing so, it views, from the start, the specific subject from the perspective of a plurality of possible standpoints (also past and future) and then situates it in a political context. Accordingly, the concrete historical constellations which form the background for rsa statements, texts or essays can be taken into consideration and, at the same time, a (self-)reflective method can be established. As a result, the critical examination of one’s own tradition and its current forms of reception could be subjected time and again to new perspectives and insights, thereby, establishing, so to say, (self-)reflection permanently, instead of concluding the problem by means of subsumption.